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This Working Paper forms part of CBR Research Programme 3 
on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Abstract 
Across Europe those who create and run high-tech SMEs have become a 
primary focus of industrial policy.  Part of the rationale for the focus on small 
high-tech firms lies in the desire to emulate the experience of the US, 
particularly Silicon Valley and Boston in which spinning off new ventures from 
research institutions has been seen to play a key role.  By comparison the 
performance of Europe’s research base has been less dynamic.  A more 
pro-active stance towards new ventures created by HEIs is welcomed, however 
to focus policy too narrowly on this group has inherent dangers.  There is a 
danger of implicitly promoting a particular business model: one emphasising 
personal financial gain and venture capital funding, which may be at variance 
with those prevailing among the broad spectrum of existing high-tech small 
firms.  
 
The characteristics, pre-occupations and problems of the vast bulk of small 
firms operating in high-tech sectors, and making a contribution to international 
competitiveness through innovation and export may be overlooked in the 
current policy climate.  By way of redress this paper reports the preliminary 
findings from a qualitative study of 25 existing small high technology firms in 
the UK.  The themes outlined include: the motivation and drivers of 
entrepreneurship, the nature of collaboration with HEIs, relationships with 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recognition of the economic significance of small firms grew during the last 
quarter of the 20
th century (Loveman, and Sengenberger 1991; Acs and Audretsch, 
1993).  It has been suggested that small firms played a major role in net new job 
creation (Birch, 1979, Storey, 1980; Labour Force Quarterly, 1993), in providing 
counter cyclical protection of employment (Storey and Johnson, 1987; Davidsson 
et. al. 1999), and have characterised rapid growth activities, particular those based 
on new technologies (Phillips, 1991; SBA, 1999). 
 
In the UK, several strands of policy have coalesced into concern for ‘international 
competitiveness’ in which the creation of new technology-based firms (ntbfs) plays 
a leading role (Wren, 2001).  This focus reflects desires to emulate US experience.  
Across Europe policy-makers and popular press alike have been fired by the role of 
HEIs in generating ntbfs witnessed in the US.  Initiatives aimed at encouraging and 
facilitating research base spin-outs have proliferated throughout Europe and 
elsewhere
1.  This more pro-active stance is welcomed since compared to the US, 
the performance of Europe’s research base in generating ntbfs has been less 
dynamic (Acs, et. al. 1999; Gill, et. al. 2000).   
 
There are inherent dangers however, of small high-tech HEI spin-out companies 
becoming the sole focus of policy and academic interest, and popular perception.  
The number of such companies is small.  A recent study revealed in the 5 years up 
to 2001, UK universities spun out some 554 businesses (Lockett, 2002).  To focus 
too narrowly on the needs and problems of high-tech university spin-out 
companies may distort policy such that those of the majority of small high-tech 
firms are overlooked.  Furthermore narrow focus on HEI spin-outs may constitute 
a variant of ‘picking winners’; a policy approach much debated and criticised 
(Oakey and Rothwell, 1986; Storey, et. al. 1987; Freel, 1998 ).  
 
In addition the particular business model implicitly promoted by policy may be at 
variance with those prevailing among the broad spectrum of existing high-tech 
small firms, which are diverse, relatively little understood and yet contribute to the 
economy at both local and national levels.  That ‘model’ is based on US experience 
during the 90s and emphasises the importance of equity finance, the role of venture 
capitalists and business angels, the achievement of early fast growth, the adoption 
of a distinctive set of employment practices and policies, and the pursuit of 
personal financial gain realised through the ultimate objective of IPO (Gill, et. al.   2
2000).  Many high-tech entrepreneurs, regarding this model as ‘alien’, may feel 
their problems ignored, and perceive of themselves as less important.  
 
This paper seeks redress by describing some of the preliminary findings from a 
qualitative study of 25 small high technology firms.  It focuses on entrepreneurs’ 
motivations and drivers, and their collaboration with the research base, 
relationships with customers and experiences of venture capital.  Before describing 
the findings the background to the study is outlined.  
 
2.  The study 
 
The qualitative study is part of an ongoing comparison of small high technology 
firms in the UK and Japan.  UK firms were surveyed in 1998 and again in 2001.  
Criteria for inclusion in the 2001 survey were employment size (less than 250) 
independent status, and high-tech activity.
2  Of the 237 firms taking part in 2001 (a 
response rate of 34%), face to face interviews ranging from an hour to 2½ hours 
were conducted with 25 selected from various regions in the UK.  Interviews were 
transcribed and analysed using text analysis software.  Twelve of the case study 
firms were in instrumentation (3 medical diagnostic, 4 medical devices and 
reminder industrial and photographic instruments), 6 were software firms
3, 3 
manufactured chemicals and the 4 remaining firms were in telecommunications, 
industrial design and testing.  
 
The extent to which the firms were studied could be considered as economically 
relevant and can be illustrated by looking at them in terms of the ‘competitiveness 
indicators’ set out by the DTI (DTI, 2001)
4.  Table 1 outlines the characteristics of 
firms
5 in the 2001 survey and those of the subset of 25 case study firms.  The 
majority of firms surveyed would be regarded potentially contributing to UK 
international competitiveness.  This is even more pronounced for the case study 
firms.  These were strongly engaged in R&D
6, predominantly novel innovators
7, 
collaborators, and exporters, and their workforces were well qualified. The 
majority was strongly growth-oriented and displayed an open approach towards 
risk
8.  Most had grown in terms of employment and turnover in the two years prior 
to 2001, with turnover on average doubling.     3
Table 1.  Performance of case study firms compared to all firms surveyed 
 




 (N=221)  (N=25) 
Mean age of CEO (at time of survey)    51    48 
Mean age of firm    22    12 
R&D                Mean R&D/sales ratio    13    14 
     % Undertaking R&D    75    96 
     % Patenting    33    46 
     % Licensing     8    32 
Collaboration  % Collaborating      59    83 
     % Collaborating with research base*    18    64 
Innovation      %Not undertaking     18    8 
    % Novel innovators    56    75 
Exports          % exporters   66   70 
   Mean % of turnover exported    38    52 
Turnover Growth % Recording Growth     62    71 
    Mean % growth 1998-2000    78    221 
Employment Growth % Recording Growth    52    62 
    Mean % growth 1998-2000    43    34 
Growth aim   % None    10    0 
   % Moderate     48    46 
   % Substantial     42    54 
Risk                % Open to risk   55    71 
Workforce     Mean % ft employees with                      
                        degrees 
 26   42 
   Mean % ft employees with any   
   tertiary qualification 
 54   69 
Profits           % recording profits   88    73 
IPO objective  % ‘Not at all’    52    21 
  %‘Significant/crucial’    10    29 
Venture Capital %  seeking/sought     21    34 
 
* Evidence from the case study firms suggests that such collaboration may have been 
under-reported in the survey 
   4
3.  Young academic founders? 
 
Policy focuses on ntbfs spun out of the research base by relatively young 
academics or researchers. These were not found among the case study firms.  Of 
the 23 firms in which there had been continuity of ownership, in only 5 had any of 
the original founders been their 20s.  In 10 the founders had been over 40 (3 cases 
had included people over 50) and 14 firms had been set up by people over 35 at the 
time.   
 
The spin-out company based on explicit technology developed within the research 
base, in respect of which the research base organisation may have some IPR claim, 
can be distinguished from the spin-out based on technology or know-how 
embodied in the person.  The former, seen as the potential high growth, venture 
capital backed company, is the focus of policy.  The latter gives rise to two types 
of company: the life-style scientific/technical entrepreneur is akin to the craftsman 
entrepreneur seeking self-employment rather than enterprise creation (Stanworth 
and Curran, 1976).  The second is the transitional or ‘soft start’ business beginning 
in consultancy and only after several years becoming more growth- and/or 
production-oriented (Segal, Quince and Partners, 1985; Vohora et. al 2002).  
 
Of the 22 companies in which one of the original founders was interviewed three 
approximated to the types of academic spin-out outlined above.  The nearest to the 
life style spin-out was a company set up by three members of a government 
research establishment, two of whom took early retirement to do so, this was a 
‘grey haired spin-out’.  The nearest approximation to the transitional starter began 
as a trading arm of a university department.  After experiencing management 
difficulties, it was subsequently spun out by the then 49-year old academic 
responsible for its operations within the university.  Neither firm involved transfer 
of IPR.  In the only firm close to the model of a spin-out based on technology 
developed within the research base the founders played a ‘surrogate’ role 
(Radosevich, 1995).  The initial application of the technology, (the application of 
neural networks for monitoring ‘vital’ processes) was developed by a student but 
the development of the subsequent application was taken over by a couple of serial 
entrepreneurs.  The student herself did not become involved in the business, but 
receives part of the royalties.  
 
However, in 10 of the firms interviewed one member of the founding team had 
been employed in the research base either at the time of founding or just prior.  But   5
this link between research base and emerging business was often disjointed, either 
in terms of time or organisation confirming the iterative nature of venture creation.  
Two examples illustrate this. In one, a member of a government research 
establishment was invited by a friend in academe to set up a testing/analysis 
consultancy with 4 other people. After a year of exceptional growth this business 
fell apart when one founder decided on an alternative lifestyle. The former 
government scientist was left with a potential contract so providing him with the 
opportunity to set up on his own. In the second case, the principal founder had 
worked in the respiratory unit of a hospital where along with 2 colleagues they had 
‘fiddled’ with a number of ideas for a hand-held device. Although he left the 
hospital to join a commercial firm, initially in a technical capacity but later in 
sales, he maintained interest in the development of the device eventually marketing 
it through the company to which he had moved.  The device formed the basis of 
the company, which the 3 eventually set up, with one founder remaining in medical 
research.   
 
This tendency for the link to persist through one founder remaining in the research 
base occurred in 7 of the 10 businesses.  In some cases after a few years there was 
parting of the ways with the research base founder ‘selling out’, usually amicably.  
Confirming the view that entrepreneurship, particularly in high-tech activities, is 
collaborative, of the 23 firms in which there was continuity of ownership, only 3 
had been founded by an individual acting alone.  These 23 firms also included 8 in 
which one or more of the founders had previously set up a business.  A high level 
of fluctuation in ownership was also apparent: with changes recorded in 16 of the 
25 firms (excluding 2 firms in which ownership had been redistributed among 
members of a founder’s immediate family).  
 
The benefits firms derived from this persistent link with the research base varied: 
for some it provided access to IPR, and to equipment and/or testing facilities, for 
others it was the channel for TCS students, and in others it facilitated links with 
other parts of the research base.  
 
4.  Motivation: ‘the buzz’ 
 
Much has been written about entrepreneurial motivation that demonstrates that 
autonomy and independence are more important motivations than financial gain 
(Townroe and Mallalieu, 1993).  The case study entrepreneurs were driven by a 
holistic complex of factors, in which personal aspirations and beliefs were   6
expressed in the need to effect beneficial changes through the actions of others 
brought together in a business entity.  Three components in this complex can be 
identified: ‘intellectual’, ‘instrumental’ and ‘indirect’, the fusion of which may 
differentiate entrepreneurs in high-tech sectors from academics and self-employed 
technical consultants.  The first component operated at the level of intrinsic 
intellectual satisfaction, was concerned with ‘creativity’ in its broadest sense and 
expressed as a need for ‘novelty’, ‘problem solving’, ‘challenge’ and expanding 
‘learning’ and ‘experience’.  
 
‘there must be an element of challenge, something new to learn….. The 
pursuit of knowledge and challenge are important on a personal 
level’……if I’m not learning something is wrong’  Instruments SI  
 
Intellectual challenges need not be solely technical or scientific, several 
entrepreneurs commented on their changing nature. 
 
I’ve ended up doing more and more managerial roles… and that’s been a 
different challenge.  I’ve enjoyed that just as much as the technical 
challenges’. Instruments MM  
 
While this need for intrinsic intellectual satisfaction was a necessary driver it was 
not a sufficient one.  The second component: being ‘instrumental’, was the 
excitement of seeing what those solutions lead to, particularly in terms of what 
they enabled others (customers or potential customers) to do.  This links to the 
notion of ‘customer empathy’ outlined later.  But it was often vaguely altruistic: 
wanting to effect beneficial changes. 
 
‘That that investment has changed someone else, added value for those 
customers who have invested in our products.  To add value to others’ 
businesses, I like the positive feedback..’ Instruments H 
 
The final motivational component was satisfaction derived from effecting change 
‘indirectly’ through the actions of others.  This was not just about being part of a 
team, about wanting to share enthusiasm and objectives as described by 
Katzenbach and Smith (1998).  It was about taking pleasure in the achievements of 
others in a context created and maintained by the entrepreneur.   
   7
I like solving team problems in a team manner. We all get esteem out of 
thinking something first but I love to see other people succeed. 
Instruments CO 
 
It was the fusion of the three components which was important in the motivational 
context, as the following illustrates: 
 
‘You solve the technical problems and then one day you walk into a 
company and someone says ‘Is that from your company?’ And all that 
part, the technical part, is what you yourself did and there are dozens 
and dozens of them around.  And that feels pretty good. And that’s a real 
achievement……..  the next stage ….. is that it is not just one thing out 
there working it’s a whole stream of things that have been put together 
by a group of people and that group of people is being held together by 
the job that I do.  So you then start to identify as a company rather than 
as an individual and ….start to praise the work done by all the people in 
the company….., and that gives you a good feeling. Everybody is….. 
feeling the way you felt when you started it. ……..You get enjoyment from 
watching the forest grow rather than tending the plants. Instruments 
GCS 
 
There were two additional aspects of the ‘intellectual’ motivational component.  
The first was the orientation towards personal development.  The qualifications 
obtained by the entrepreneurs on leaving formal education varied: some left school 
with few qualifications, others had progressed through the system gaining first and 
post-graduate degrees.  Regardless of qualifications gained early in life there was a 
desire to continue to learn.  For some, this manifests itself in gaining formal 
educational qualifications, either through part-time or distance learning courses or 
by returning to full time education, such that the range of their educational 
qualifications was far narrower when interviewed than it would have been when 
they were 25 years old.  Other entrepreneurs took more specific and applied 
courses and some undertook self-taught activities.  This orientation was reflected 
in the importance placed on personal development for employees. 
 
The second aspect of the need for intellectual stimulation was what happened when 
it diminished.  Some entrepreneurs reported either feeling less challenged or that 
the nature of the challenge had become less intellectually stimulating.  In both 
situations the feeling was that the opportunities to learn and be creative had shrunk.   8
   
‘I’m bored because I’m not learning……. and I want to learn…..  it gets 
more and more challenging everyday because of the market situation.  
But that is an operational challenge as opposed to an intellectual 
challenge……... I need that next intellectual challenge…Software DT 
 
These CEOs faced dilemmas about the development of their business and some 
had begun to look at opportunities for personal financial gain.   
 
I’ve created value in this business and I’d like to realize some of that. ….. 
now I want to look after myself personally because that’s something I’ve 
not done’. The same entrepreneur as above. 
 
It may be that it is only when the intellectual satisfaction they need from their 
business diminishes that some high-tech entrepreneurs start to ask ‘What else can I 
get out of this’.  The suggestion that personal financial rewards are some kind of 
substitute for intellectual satisfaction not only flies in the face of neo-classical 
economic explanations of entrepreneurial motivations but also undermines the 
business model implicit in current policy.   
 
A clear and important distinction was apparent between personal financial gain and 
wealth, and the financial health and profitability of the business.  The former was 
eschewed by most entrepreneurs but being profitable was clearly important for the 
business: money was the facilitator.  
 
‘Not driven by money, we have underpaid ourselves…..But we are 
interested in money from the sense that it enables us to invest and 
develop new products.   Instruments H 
 
5.  Collaboration with the Research Base 
 
Almost two thirds of the firms interviewed had collaborated and had contacts with 
the research base that extended beyond founding links. Fourteen of the fifteen 
manufacturing firms collaborated with the research base. For the medical devices 
and diagnostics instrument manufacturers collaboration was often a statutory 
requirement and for some of the former there was also the issue of ‘clinical’ trials: 
either again because of regulation, or because it assisted market credibility.  Such   9
links were often multifaceted: medical consultants were frequently at one and the 
same time, customers, and the source of new product ideas and IPR.  
 
‘For us to develop a product we do have to have the co-operation of what 
they call a Competent Medical Practitioner.  ..It’s the sine qua non of 
developing these things………………..  We quite like paying a royalty but 
in some cases we haven’t’. Medical devices EP 
 
Two features about links with the research base were first the number of 
universities that firms had links with; it was not unusual 4 or 5 to be listed, and 
second the diversity of type of link. The most common link was sponsoring 
students. 
 
At the moment we have a master’s student, a PhD student, a TCS student 
and a major European Framework project all linking us in with local 
universities.  Instruments PS 
 
Other modes of collaboration included product development, often under SMART 
and SPUR awards, sponsorship of projects, use of academics as consultants and 
licensing.  Another side of collaboration was where entrepreneurs became involved 
in university activities.  This was reported by 6 firms: in one case the entrepreneur 
was an external examiner and visiting professor, in another there was active 
involvement in student projects. 
 
‘Their second year students have an annual design project that they run 
with us and we mentor’  Instruments CO 
 
Two-way relationships were found with the firm providing products that the 
academic could not obtain from other sources and the university enabling the firm 
to keep its grip on developments.  
 
‘ we can supply him with product that he couldn’t get elsewhere…..  to 
continue his research.  ….we have registered one of our guys for an 
external PhD with him and our purpose is to maintain   up to date views 
on what is coming through as potential new products for us.’  Chemicals 
LCM 
   10
In an unusual case the academic had acted as a ‘marriage broker’.  Approached by 
one of the entrepreneurs with a view to starting a PhD the academic suggested that, 
rather than study the topic, the entrepreneur should ‘just do it’ and put him in 
contact with a mature student unable to fund further studies.  The mature student 
and entrepreneur jointly set up the business.   
 
There was overwhelming support for, and endorsement of, the TCS (Teaching 
Company Scheme).  However, it was apparent that, as the balance of support 
changed with successive use, for many it became less attractive and a less viable 
option.  
 
In the main these non-founding contacts and collaborations were effected through, 
and depended on, close personal relationships, often established in previous 
employment and persisting over many years; 15- to 20-year relationships were not 
uncommon.   
 
Technology transfer is a ‘Body Contact Sport’.  Its about people, it is not 
about places. Instrument PS 
 
Where academics moved to other institutions so the collaboration followed them.  
 
‘It all just comes through personal relationships …..The connection at 
Oxford that all came through me. And the connection with Essex came 
because some the people I knew at Oxford moved on to Essex’. 
Instruments GCS 
 
Collaborating with universities was not without its problems. IPR problems were 
most frequently mentioned.  Some entrepreneurs complained of universities being 
‘greedy’ particularly in situations where the work was sponsored by the small firm.  
 
‘, sponsored by us, but we pulled out when the university demanded 40% 
of the rights’ Medical devices F 
 
Others complained about the complexity of the licensing process particularly 
where the TTO was seen as inefficient.  
   11
‘I'd licensed products before…… but, this (licensing from a university) 
was just horrendous. I've never seen so much paper work.  ……..they 
probably spent more on their solicitors than they got out of me for the 
royalty or are still getting.’ Chemicals VO   
 
Some reported a worrying lack of IPR clarity in situations where the company was 
sponsoring a student, involved in TCS or CASE or collaborating on a SMART 
award, which had potential detrimental effects  
 
IPR has even been difficult under the TCS…...  … I'm not sure who owns 
the IPR on that (which we) did under a SMART award..  And that's not 
good if you really want to use the technology. … I think it is down to the 
Technology Transfer Office….., they should be able to establish a clear 
view on these things. Chemicals VO 
 
The second problem reported in the collaboration with universities was the failure 
of academics in some universities to understand the gulf between making a 
prototype or working model, and a commercially viable product. 
 
‘people from universities think they've finished when they've got a 
working model……  But that's a long way from something that we can 
sell…..  The gap between making the thing work and putting it into a 
product, which is commercially viable, is still very much underestimated. 
Academics see it as just a 'task' whereas in fact there are real skills 
involved….   Instruments DI. 
 
6.  Customer Relationships  
 
The entrepreneurs interviewed sought long-term relationships with customers 
based on integrity and trust rather than maximisation of individual contracts or 
deals.  The establishment of such long-term relationships, often expressed as 
‘partnerships’, depended on integrity, reliability and excellence in performance.   
  
Integrity is very important.  If you start lying to yourself and to your 
customers then you are on a slippery slope, that means you can never be 
the best because you are not trusted’.  Software BCS 
   12
We are always seeking continuous and repetitive business, even if that 
means sacrificing some margin in the short term.  ….We will tell 
customers a lot more about how things are made and show them a lot 
more than if we were a big corporation.     And that builds trust…. 
Chemicals LCM 
 
‘it’s an attitude of mind to be the best, and if you are not the best you 
won’t be in business’. Software NG 
 
It was suggested above that one entrepreneurial driver was the need to be 
instrumental, usually expressed in terms of effecting some benefit for customers, as 
the earlier quote illustrated. This required ‘customer empathy’: the ability to see 
the product or service through the eyes of the customer, what it enabled them to do 
and where improvement for the customer could be made. 
 
It’s partnership because although we'll develop the material for them, it 
is often the case that the formulation they give us is crap.  We go back to 
them and say look we know that we can improve on this.  Chemicals VO 
 
Customer empathy had been developed through various routes but it was rarely 
achieved quickly: some entrepreneurs had strong sales and marketing backgrounds 
and had collaborated with technical people. Others had a depth of technical or 
scientific experience, and had either gone through a process of ‘soft start’, or had 
collaborated with marketing people. In a few cases individual entrepreneurs 
combined both backgrounds, starting on the technical or scientific side but moving 
into sales before setting up the business.   
 
7.  Venture Capitalists   
 
By and large, experiences of venture capitalists and business angels had been 
negative.  Those with the most experience, the serial entrepreneurs tended to be the 
most vociferous.  VCs were seen as exploitive, having short-term orientations, 
little regard for employees, subject to the whims of technological fashion, having a 
superficial view of technology and not really interested in high-risk projects.  
 
if these people ………. are outside of the discipline I think they really find 
it difficult to understand the developments and what they mean. 
Chemicals UFC   13
‘They are not interested in anything which they see as being a risk.   
What’s the point of ‘venture’ it’s a joke’  Medical devices S 
 
They were very keen, saw this at the time as leading edge software.  But 2 
years later they’d changed their minds and decided that wasn’t what they 
should be interested in, and we were too small…… they have no concept 
of long term planning.  it’s a very fashion driven industry Instruments H 
 
‘if you ever want to finish up with any percentage of the business you 
don’t go early to the people who provide start up money…… you put in 
all your skill, expertise, entrepreneurship.. and you’re really relying on 
people whose only interest is making money out of it and they will 
manipulate the fact that you’ve got nothing left Instruments C 
 
However from both the negative stories and the recent positive experiences of two 
firms, important insights emerged. In respect of business angel two specific 
problems were identified. First the failure of business angel networks to vet 
members leading problems of time wasters and uncertainty as to members’ real 
intentions. 
 
‘anyone can put their name on the Business Angel list ….but nobody 
screens them. ….there’s no way of telling the genuine from the 
others……Some of them are simply spies, out to steal other people’s 
ideas. My main complaint is that they waste time Medical devices S. 
 
The other problem was that of the inability of some angels to step outside of their 
own experiences: 
 
I had one who’d run some shoe shops and …….. another one who was in 
fish paste… all kinds of people, have done well, have got 
money,…..become part of this nice angel group but actually know bugger 
all about managing international businesses. And yet they feel that 
because they’ve done well you have to listen to them, of course they have 
a controlling element in the business. It’s very difficult to manage those 
people. Instruments C. 
 
The second insight was that money was only part of what was looked for in the 
relationships with the VC.  Not simply understanding the technology but also being   14
able to offer technical expertise, providing management help and contacts were all 
important.  
 
they had technical specialists they could bring into the equation so that 
they could demonstrate to us that they were not just a finance house 
Instruments SI. 
 
Disappointment and resentment emerged if the promised assistance failed to 
materialize.  
 
When they put the thing in they said they would give us some 
management assistance to help us develop the business,…..  But it just 
never happened……They were very distant. I decided the best thing was 
to get shot of them,…..we weren’t going to put a lot of extra effort into 
the company if they were going to get the rewards.  Once they were out of 
the way it allowed us to focus and become market leaders. Software BCS 
 
What many entrepreneurs looked for was a personal relationship in which an 
individual VC or group of individuals could demonstrate that they had ‘bought 
into’ and shared the vision.  They were looking for personal commitment.  
 
we selected them on the basis of the people we met and how much we 
thought they would be committed to our company Instruments GCS.  
 
The model of VC funding is based on US experience but the extent to which it can 
be successfully transferred to the UK depends in large part on the VC industries in 
the UK and US being similar: they may not be. 
 
It (US VC industry) bears no relationship to venture capital here….. they 
are harder, they’re a lot tougher……..But when they get involved … they 
stick with the company…...  They don’t do it in a trivial way. Instruments 
C. 
   15
8.  Conclusions 
 
The opening comments of many interviews was ‘We don’t fit the model’, ‘This is 
business as it shouldn’t be done’. The ‘model’ sees enterprise inception within a 
relatively narrow time frame, and emphasizes personal material rewards, rapid 
growth and equity funding through venture capital. The case studies reinforce the 
view that high-tech enterprise creation is iterative and collaborative.  The studies 
suggest a complex of motivational factors: the 3 ‘i’s of intellectual satisfaction, 
being instrumental in effecting change and obtain satisfaction indirectly through 
the actions of others. Although generally seeking substantial growth, the 
entrepreneurs were cautious about recruitment. Their own orientations toward 
personal development were reflected in promoting employees’ personal 
development. Within a local area they potentially contributed to improving the 
workforce and providing better quality jobs.  
 
By definition the firms operated in niche markets, some were market leaders but 
their position depended on developing ‘customer empathy’. Such empathy takes 
time, effort and mutual trust to achieve. Similarly the personal aspects of the 
relationship: the extent to which the vision was shared and technology truly 
understood were important factors in respect of venture capital.  Developing and 
testing out such relationships takes time and arguably a broad perspective on both 
sides.  Finally, the firms studied had extensive links with the research base but 
again these were effected through personal relationships and achieved through 
mechanisms far more cost-effective than those supporting nascent academic 
businesses.  It is the crucial role of personal relationships which emerges, and 
which simplistic policy measures cannot address. 
 
Improving the UK’s international competitiveness depends on both new high-tech 
venture creation and the health of existing high-tech firms including small firms.  
Schemes such as the TCS which are tried, tested and well supported may have a 
diverse and long term impact on high-tech small firms’ prosperity as yet 
unacknowledged.  There is a need for policy and popular perception alike to 
recognize the importance and concerns of the main body of existing high-tech 
small firms: the ‘beer’, and not be blinded by the attraction of the ‘froth’ that is the 
research base spin-out.  
 
 




1  Initiatives at the regional or national level include in the UK the University 
Challenge Fund and Science Enterprise Challenge, in France in the 
establishment of 31 regional incubators and changes in the law concerning the 
rights of researchers at public research institutes to be actively involved in 
companies.   
 
2   Classification based on modifications to Butchart’s 1987 definitions based on 
a work by Hecker 1999. 
 
3    Firms undertaking routine computer services were excluded from the survey. 
 
4   Studies of this type invariably involve self-selection by those who participate. 
This raises questions about representativeness. We cannot claim that the firms 
were in any statistical sense ‘representative’ of small high-tech businesses. 
However a number of points suggest that we are not dealing with an unduly 
co-operative or supportive group of firms. First, not all those taking part could 
be described as successful. Second, considerable effort was expended 
telephoning to win over agreement to participate and, finally, several of the 
CEOs of the case study firms commented that they ‘did not normally fill in 
questionnaires’. 
 
5   Self-employed sole traders were not included in the survey but a number of 
firms comprised several working partners or directors and no full-time 
employees.  
 
6    Spending on R&D as a percentage of turnover in 1996 was on average 4% 
among service firms and just under 4% among manufacturing firms DTI. 
 
7    A novel innovation is the introduction during the past 2 years of a product, 
process or logistic innovation, which was new to both the firm and the 
industry. 
 
8    Respondents to the 2001 survey were asked to describe their approach 
towards risk in an open question.  
   17
References 
 
Acs, Z. J. and Audretsch, D, B. 1993, Small Firms and Entrepreneurship: An 
East-West Perspective. 
Acs, Z. J., Carlsson, B. and Karlsson, C. eds. 1999, Entrepreneurship, Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Macroeconomy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Birch, D. L. 1979, ‘The Job Generation Process’, US Department of Commerce, 
MIT Programme on Neighbourhood and Regional Change, reprinted in Small 
Business: Critical Perspectives on Business and Management, 2000, edited by 
D. J. Storey, Routledge, London. 
Butchart, R. L. 1987, ‘A new UK Definition of the High Technology Industries’ 
Economic Trends, No. 400, February. 
DTI, 2001 ‘UK Competitiveness Indicators’ Second Edition HMSO London.  
Davidsson P., Lindmark, L,. and Olofsson, C., 1999, ‘SMEs and Job Creaton 
During Recession and Recovery’ in Entrepreneurship, Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises and the Macroeconomy’ (eds.) Z. Acs, B. Carlsson and C 
Karlsson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gill, D., Martin, C. Minshall, T. and Rigby, M., 2000, Funding Technology: 
Lessons from America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Freel, M. 1998, ‘Policy, prediction and growth: Picking start-up winners?’ Journal 
of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 5 (1) 19-32. 
Hecker, D., 1999, ‘High technology employment: a broader view’, Monthly Labor 
Review, June 1999. 
Katenbach, J. R. and Smith, D. K., 1998, The Wisdom of Teams: Creating the high 
performance organization, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead. 
Loveman, G. and Sengenberger, W, 1991, ‘The Re-emergence of Small Scale 
Production: An International Comparison’ Small Business Economics, 3 (1) 
1-39. 
Labour Force Quarterly, 1993, ‘Job Creation the contribution of Small and Large 
Firms’, August 10-12. 
Lockett, A. 2002, ‘University Technology Transfer and Policy Implications’ paper 
presented at ‘Creating Science Based Start-ups’ Conference of the 
Association of European Science and Technology Transfer Professionals ETH 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland, 10-11
th October 
2002.  
Oakey, R. and Rothwell, R., 1986, ‘High Technology Small Firms and Regional 
Industrial Growth’, in Technological change, industrial restructuring and   18
regional development, (eds) A. Amin and J. B. Goddard, Allen and Unwin, 
London, 
Phillips, B. D. 1991, ‘The Increasing Role of Small Firms in the High Technology 
Sector: Evidence from the 1980s’ Business Economics, 40-47 
Radosevich, R. 1995, ‘A model for entrepreneurial spin-off from public technology 
sources’, International Journal of Technology Management, 10 (7/8) 879-93. 
Segal, Quince and Partners, 1985, The Cambridge Phenomenon: The Growth of 
High Technology Industry in a University Town, Segal, Quince and Partners, 
Cambridge, 
U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy (SBA), 1999, The Facts 
About Small Business1999, U.S. Small Business Administration Office of 
Advocacy, Washington. 
Stanworth, M. K. and Curran, J., 1976, ‘Growth of the Small Firm: An Alternative 
View’, Journal of Management Studies 13 (2) 95-110.  
Storey, D., 1980, Job Generation and Small Firms Policy in Britain, Research 
Series Paper Number 11, Centre for Environmental Studies, London. 
Storey, D, and Johnson, S., 1987, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and 
Employment Creation in the EEC Countries, Commission of the European 
Communities, Programme of Research and Actions on the development of the 
Labour Market, study No. 85/407. 
Storey, D., Keasey, K., Watson, R. and Wynarczyk, P., 1987, The performance of 
small firms: Profits, jobs and growth, Croom Helm, London. 
Townroe, P. and Mallalieu, K, 1993, ‘Founding a new business in the countryside’ 
in Small Firms in Urban and Rural Locations (eds.) J. Curran and D. Storey 
Routledge, London.   
Vohora, A., Heirman, A., Clarysse, B., Van de Velde, E., and Quince, T. 2002, 
‘Spinning off new ventures: a typology of facilitating services’, paper 
presented at Babson/Kauffman Entrepreneurship Conference, University of 
Colorado, June 2002. 
Wren, C., 2001, ‘The Industrial Policy of Competitiveness: A Review of Recent 
Development in the UK’, Regional Studies, 35 (9) 847-860. 